You can't take it with you: asset run-down at the end of the life cycle by Katharine Anderson et al.
40 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
You can’t take it with you: Asset run-down at the end
of the life cycle
Kate Anderson, Eric French, and Tina Lam
Kate Anderson is a graduate student at the University of
Michigan. Eric French is a senior economist and Tina
Lam is an associate economist in the Economic Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The
authors thank Dan Sullivan, Jonas Fisher, Yukako Ono,
and Craig Furfine.
Introduction and summary
The life-cycle model is the workhorse of most analyses
of saving and is widely used to evaluate the macro-
economic and distributional effects of various policy
proposals such as the repeal of estate taxation.
The life-cycle model presumes that people are for-
ward-looking and make their current consumption and
savings decisions based on their preferences for con-
sumption and knowledge of their future income. In
its simplest form, the model assumes that individuals
know with perfect certainty the age at which they will
die. Moreover, this simplest model assumes that indi-
viduals do not value inheritances to their children. That
is, they have no bequest motive. Under this model, all
individuals die with no wealth, because if an individ-
ual were about to die and had no bequest motive, he
would be better off consuming all of his remaining
wealth than if he died with some wealth remaining.
Making a few additional assumptions about individuals’
expectations of the future and their preferences1 allows
us to predict an individual’s consumption and, thus,
wealth at each age.2
Although this simple version of the life-cycle model
is unrealistic, it is also simple to analyze. As a result,
it is often used to evaluate policy reforms (Altig et al.,
1997). However, this simple version of the life-cycle
model is unable to replicate several key facts. Perhaps
most importantly, empirical research shows that many
households retain large amounts of assets even in old
age (see Hurd, 1990, for a review).3 Some have argued
that the fact that many households do not run down
their assets is evidence of a bequest motive, meaning
that elderly people do not keep assets just for them-
selves, but also for their children.
Because most of the literature on policy reform
relies on the simple life-cycle model, it has assumed
saving behavior that compares poorly with the mi-
croeconomic data. It is possible that changing the
assumptions of the simple life-cycle model to better
describe the data will also change the results of the
studies that use these models. Thus, a better understand-
ing and quantitative analysis of household saving be-
havior may have a substantial impact on the evaluation
of policy reforms, such as reforming the Social Secu-
rity system, Medicare, and changing estate taxes.
To illustrate this point, we look at a policy issue
where it is important to consider savings motives of
individuals at the end of their lives: estate taxation.
On July 7, 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Re-
lief Reconciliation Act was signed into law, which
will gradually reduce estate taxation starting in the
year 2002. The estate tax is a tax on assets that remain
after an individual dies. The estate tax will be com-
pletely repealed in the year 2010.4 Before the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act was passed,
only estates valued over $675,000 were taxed. By the
year 2002, the exemption had risen to $1,000,000.
Whether or not this reform increases or reduces gross
domestic product (GDP) depends critically on the
strength of the bequest motive. Therefore, whether we
assume a bequest motive has a dramatic effect on the
conclusions that we draw and the policy recommen-
dations that we make. If, as in the simple life-cycle
model, individuals have no bequest motive and, thus,
do not value the estate they leave to their children,
the estate tax will not affect the economic behavior
of households.5 The likely alternative to taxes on
assets left after death is a tax on income while alive.41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
In contrast to estate taxes, income taxes will likely re-
duce savings and work effort, which causes economic
inefficiency, or “deadweight loss.” It is likely that any
loss of federal income due to a repeal of the estate taxes
will force an increase in income taxes. Therefore, as-
suming that progressivity is a desirable feature in a tax
system and distortions on work decisions and savings
are undesirable, the repeal of the estate tax might be
seen as undesirable; the decrease in estate taxes reduces
progressivity, while the increase in the income tax
distorts saving behavior.
On the other hand, if we move away from the sim-
ple life-cycle model, our conclusions may be different.
If households have strong bequest motives, repealing
the estate tax may have a non-trivial effect on saving
decisions. (Castaneda et al., 2003, and Cagetti and
DeNardi, 2003). For example, Cagetti and DeNardi
(2003) find that eliminating the estate tax and replacing
it with an increased labor income tax would raise GDP
by .7 percent. Therefore, if bequest motives are very
important, then the repeal of the estate tax is poten-
tially a good idea.
In the above analysis, our conclusions differed dra-
matically depending on whether we used the simple
life-cycle model or one that assumes a bequest motive.
This indicates that understanding bequest motives is
important to making policy decisions. An important
first step for determining the strength of the bequest
motive is to determine whether individuals decumu-
late or run down assets at the end of their lives. The
absence of asset decumulation is potential evidence
that bequest motives are important. The goal of this
article is to provide new evidence on the extent to which
households run down their assets near the end of the
life cycle. Using data from Assets and Health Dynamics
of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), we document asset growth
at each age for members of different cohorts. This al-
lows us to consider the quantitative importance of
the asset decumulation puzzle.
There are several econometric problems with the
existing evidence on asset run-down. We discuss these
problems, as well as our approach to overcoming them.
We find that whereas the usual approach for document-
ing asset run-down at the end of the life cycle shows
some evidence of run-down, correcting for some im-
portant econometric problems removes almost all traces
of asset run-down.
Asset run-down as predicted by the life-
cycle model
In this section, we briefly describe the amount of
asset run-down that we would expect to see if people
behaved according to the life-cycle model. We calibrate
a simple life-cycle model, as described in appendix A.
Individuals in the model make consumption and sav-
ing decisions depending on their current assets, their
perceived income and medical expenses in the future,
how long they expect to live, and whether they have
a bequest motive.
A model can not tell us what causes people to save.
However, it can help us to frame the questions we need
to ask in order to understand the causes of savings. A
model that is calibrated to the data can also illuminate
the likely causes of why individuals run down their
assets so slowly. In this section, we provide evidence
that uncertain life expectancy, uncertain medical ex-
penses, and bequest motives are all potentially impor-
tant savings incentives at the end of the life cycle.
We begin with the simplest version of the model,
then move to more complex models. First, we present
the case where individuals face no medical expense
risk, have no bequest motive, and are certain to live
12 years, which is the average life expectancy for a
man aged 70.
Panel A of figure 1 presents the asset profile im-
plied by this model and highlights its key implication—
Assets at age 82, the age of certain death, are equal
to zero. This implication of the life-cycle model is at
odds with the data, as we describe below.
Panel B of figure 1 presents the asset profile im-
plied by a model augmented to include mortality risk.
Life expectancy is still 12 years, but there exists the
possibility of living much longer.6 Panel B shows that
individuals run down their assets much more slowly
when the model is augmented to account for uncertain
life expectancy. Because individuals are risk averse,
they do not wish to outlive their financial resources.
By holding assets until a very old age, they insure them-
selves against the risk of outliving their financial re-
sources. Nevertheless, the model still predicts that by
age 95, assets are near zero. Conditional on being age
70, there is only a 4 percent chance of surviving to age
95. Moreover, two annual mortality rates exceed 20
percent by age 95. Therefore, this model predicts that
individuals would bear the risk of low consumption at
age 95 in the event that they survive to that age. How-
ever, as we show below, this does not fit what is ac-
tually observed; many people still hold considerable
levels of assets, even at age 95. Therefore, it seems that
uncertain life expectancy alone cannot explain the slow
rate of asset decumulation we observe in the data.7
The risk of catastrophic out-of pocket medical ex-
penses also helps explain the absence of asset run-down.
Even in the presence of social insurance (Medicare
and Medicaid), households still face potentially sub-
stantial out of-pocket medical expenses (see French42 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 1
Asset profiles
A. No uncertainty or bequest motive
C. Life expectancy and medical expense uncertainty
B. Life expectancy uncertainty
D. Life expectancy and medical expense uncertainty
































and Jones, 2004b; Palumbo, 1999; and Feenberg and
Skinner, 1994). Moreover, nursing home expenses
are potentially large and virtually uninsurable. French
and Jones (2004b) find that in any given year, 1 per-
cent of all households incur a medical expense shock
that costs $44,000 over their lifetimes and .1 percent
of all households incur a medical expense shock that
costs $125,000 over their lifetimes. The risk of incur-
ring such expenses repeatedly could financially deci-
mate a household; this could cause a household to keep
a large amount of assets in order to buffer itself against
the possibility of catastrophic medical expenses. There-
fore, the risk of catastrophic medical expenses might
generate precautionary savings on top of those accu-
mulated against the risk of living a very long life. Panel C
of figure 1 presents the asset profile implied by a
model augmented to include medical expenses, as well
as mortality risk. It shows that individuals run down
their assets much more slowly when faced with med-
ical expense risk. Nevertheless, they still run down their
assets much more quickly than we see in the data.8
Lastly, panel D of figure 1 presents the asset pro-
files implied by a model augmented to include a bequest
function, as well as medical expenses and mortality
risk. Unsurprisingly, asset run-down at the end of the
life cycle is even slower when we augment to the model
to include a bequest function. In short, uncertain life
expectancy, uncertain medical expenses, and bequest
motives all potentially play a part in asset run-down.
Therefore, while a relatively slow rate of asset run-
down is not necessarily evidence of a bequest motive,
it is consistent with a bequest motive.43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Data
In order to estimate the extent of asset run-down,
we use data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among
the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset. The AHEAD is a
sample of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 70
or older in 1993. A total of 8,222 individuals in 6,047
households were interviewed for the AHEAD survey
in 1993. These individuals were interviewed again in
1995, 1998, and 2000. The AHEAD data include a
nationally representative core sample, as well as addition-
al samples of blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents.
The AHEAD has information on the value of hous-
ing and real estate, autos, liquid assets (which include
money market accounts, savings accounts, and Trea-
sury bills), IRAs (individual retirement accounts), Keogh
plans, stocks, the value of a farm or business, mutual
funds, bonds, and “other” assets and investment trusts
less mortgages and other debts. However, we do not
include pension and Social Security wealth in order
to maintain comparability with other studies (for ex-
ample, Hurd, 1989, and Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000).
There are two important problems with our asset
data. The first is that the wealthy tend to underreport
their wealth in virtually all household surveys (Davies
and Shorrocks, 2000). This will lead us to understate
asset levels at all ages. However, Juster et al. (1999)
show that the wealth distribution of the AHEAD matches
up well with aggregate values for all but the richest
1 percent of households. A second important problem
with our data is that it spans the years 1993 to 2000,
a period in which there was a rapid rise in asset prices.
This makes it difficult for us to distinguish between
intended asset growth through active saving versus
unintended asset growth though unexpectedly high
asset returns.
There are also several econometric problems com-
mon to all panel data. Perhaps most importantly, the
panel data suffer from attrition. In other words, people
leave the sample over time. Interviewers make serious
efforts to repeatedly interview the same individuals
over time, but they are not always successful. There
are many reasons for attrition in panel data. In the
AHEAD survey, attrition is largely due to death. This
information is recorded, and reported deaths are con-
firmed using the National Death Index. However, in
some cases, interviewers are unable to track down
sample members as they move homes, and some in-
dividuals refuse to give interviews.
This attrition raises two problems. First, those who
leave the sample may be different from those who re-
main in the sample for systematic reasons. For example,
wealthy individuals may not wish to report their
wealth and refuse to be interviewed. Second, it is dif-
ficult to know whether an individual who leaves the
sample is still alive. Individuals who cannot be con-
tacted may have moved, but they also may be dead.
Once again, this will cause problems if the people
who are difficult to contact differ systematically from
those we are able to keep track of. If, for example, it
is relatively difficult to track down poor individuals
who die, then we will potentially understate mortality
rates for relatively poor people. Nevertheless, we find
that, of 5,992 households, representing 23,053 house-
hold-year observations, only 502 leave the survey for
reasons other than death versus 1,930 who die during
the survey period. Removing those who leave for
reasons other than death leaves us with a sample of
5,490 households, representing 20,527 household-year
observations. Therefore, we view attrition for reasons
other than death as a minor problem.
Another problem with the data is that the questions
changed and became more comprehensive as time went
by. Moreover, as respondents developed greater trust
in the survey, they appeared to become more willing
to report truthfully. As a result, much of the increase
in assets over time, especially between 1993 and 1995,
should be viewed with some skepticism. Table 1 shows
average reported assets in each wave, by type of asset.
Note that both reported business wealth and stock market
wealth more than double between 1993 and 1995. Al-
though asset prices grew quickly over this time period
(see figure 5 on p. 47), they averaged less than 15 per-
cent growth per year. This makes the wave 1 values of
stock and business wealth appear especially suspicious.
Life-cycle asset profiles in the cross-section
Given that most studies use cross-sectional data
to estimate the life-cycle profile of assets, we begin
by repeating this exercise. By initially replicating the
results of other studies, we can infer whether our re-
sults differ from previous results because we use dif-
ferent data or because we use different estimation
techniques. Figure 2 shows mean household assets, by
five-year age groups of the head of household, start-
ing with age 70–74 and ending at 90–94, from the
1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000 waves of the AHEAD.
There are several things that we can note from
figure 2. First, later cross-sections show higher assets
than earlier cross-sections at each age. For example,
at age 75–79 the 1993 cross-section shows assets
equal to $210,000, the 1995 cross-section shows as-
sets equal to $290,000, the 1998 cross-section shows
assets equal to $300,000, and the 2000 cross-section
shows assets equal to $400,000. Second, figure 2 shows
some evidence that assets decline with age in each44 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 1
Mean assets, by year and asset category
1993 1995 1998 2000
Housing $88,217 $94,092 $95,423 $114,559
Liquid assets 33,288 53,874 52,844 51,299
Stocks 22,012 53,496 55,870 67,485
Autos 6,634 5,759 5,726 6,646
Businesses 3,907 8,270 10,847 9,923
IRAs 6,491 9,046 11,397 12,532
Trusts 34,343 37,148 46,060 79,582
Other assets 2,404 4,086 5,044 4,752
Total debt 3,090 3,393 3,942 3,540
Total assets 194,207 262,378 279,269 343,239
Number of observations 4,694 4,174 3,318 2,704
cross-section. The 1993 asset profile shows assets de-
clining from $240,000 at age 70–74 to $100,000 at
age 90–94. Asset profiles for other years also show
rapid declines in assets between ages 70 and 94.
Because the distribution of assets is skewed (that
is, a small number of households have very high assets),
mean assets can give a misleading depiction of the
asset distribution at each age. Nevertheless, median
and mean asset profiles have similar shapes. For ex-
ample, in 1993 median assets were $110,000 for house-
holds aged 70–74 and only $30,000 for households
aged 90–94. These results suggest that assets do decline
with age. Recall, however, that those who are 90–94
in a given year were born 20 years earlier than those
aged 70–74 in the same year, and thus had lower life-
time income.
In the past, cross-sectional data were used to
infer life-cycle saving decisions because of a lack of
data. Until recently, panel data on wealth
were not available, so most analyses of
the life cycle were based on single cross-
sections by necessity (see Hurd, 1990,
who mentions the rare exceptions). Be-
low, we discuss some of the problems as-
sociated with using a cross-sectional
profile to infer the evolution of wealth
over the life cycle.
Estimation issues
We estimate life-cycle asset profiles
of households. However, there are three
main problems with the estimation of
life-cycle asset profiles. Below, we dis-
cuss these problems, as well as our ap-
proach to dealing with them.
First, in cross-sectional data we ob-
serve individuals who were born at dif-
ferent times (that is, older people were
born in earlier years than younger people). Households
from older cohorts have on average lower real lifetime
earnings than households from younger cohorts. Thus,
we would expect the asset levels of households in old-
er cohorts to be lower than those of younger cohorts in
any given year. Therefore, comparing older households
with younger households leads the econometrician to
overstate assets when young and to understate assets
when old when looking at a particular year. In other
words, this will potentially lead the econometrician
to infer that individuals run down their assets near the
end of their lives when this is not actually the case.
Figure 3 helps quantify this point. It shows the level
of real per capita income in the United States over the
1950–2002 period. Income per capita is indexed to 100
in 1950. Figure 3 shows that in most years, income
per capita increases, averaging 1.7 percent growth
over the sample period. Therefore, two cohorts born
FIGURE 2
Mean assets, by wave and age of head of household












Sources: AHEAD data and authors’ calculations.45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
20 years apart tend to have lifetime incomes that are
different by a factor of 1.01720 = 1.40. In other words,
members of the cohort that were age 70–74 in 1993
are likely to have average lifetime incomes that are
40 percent higher than those of the cohort that were
90–94 in 1993.
A second econometric problem occurs because
people with lower income and wealth tend to die at
younger ages than richer people. Therefore, the aver-
age survivor in a cohort has higher assets than the
average deceased member of the cohort. As a result,
“mortality bias” leads the econometrician to overstate
the average lifetime income of members of a cohort.
This bias is more severe at older ages, when a greater
share of the cohort members are dead. With cross-sec-
tional data, the econometrician is forced to treat the
level of assets of surviving (and, on average, higher-
asset) members as indicative of the entire cohort, had
all members survived. This leads the econometrician
to increasingly overstate assets as individuals age.
One way to ascertain whether mortality bias will
be an issue is to look at probability of death at each
age, conditional on wealth. We made predictions by
regressing an indicator for whether the respondent died
on a polynomial in age, a polynomial in the respon-
dent’s percentile in the wealth distribution, and inter-
actions of age and percentile in the wealth distribution.
Figure 4 shows this statistic for women and men in
our sample. It shows that, conditional upon age, those
with low wealth are more likely to die than those with
high wealth. For example, in our sample, the average
probability of death for men at age 80 in 1993 is 8.0
percent.9 However, the probability of death for men
who are at the 80th percentile of the wealth distribu-
tion is 7.0 percent, whereas the probability of death
for men whose wealth is at the 20th percentile of the
wealth distribution is 10.1 percent. Conditional on
being alive at age 70, life expectancy is 14.2 years at
the 80th percentile of the wealth distribution and 11.5
years at the 20th percentile. These differences in
mortality across wealth quartiles are smaller than
differences reported in Attanasio and Hoynes (2000),
who use data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation. They report that those in the bottom
quartile of the wealth distribution have mortality rates
over double the rates of those in the top quartile of
the distribution.
We solve both of these problems by using panel
data, which allows us to track the same households
over time. Our profiles are estimated using the growth
rate of assets for surviving households in different years.
Because we are tracking the same households over
time, we are obviously tracking members of the same
cohort over time. Because we estimate growth rates
for surviving households, our estimates do not suffer
from mortality bias. Next, we detail these procedures.
While tracking the same households over time
solves the two problems discussed above, it also makes
another more serious problem. Asset growth of a
household not only represents anticipated asset growth
through savings, but also unanticipated asset growth.
Over our sample period, there are large shocks to the
rate of return on savings, primarily due to the run-up
in the stock market.
Figure 5 shows growth in the stock
market. Specifically, it shows the dollar
value of a broad portfolio of stocks in-
vested in 1950 (as measured by the Cen-
ter for Research in Security Prices data
or CRSP). The CRSP stock market index
measures the growth of a portfolio of
stocks that includes all stocks in the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ indices. It is a
broader measure of stock prices than the
S&P 500 or the Wilshire 5000 index.
Figure 5 shows that stocks grew at a
much faster rate over the 1993–2000 pe-
riod than during the previous 40 years. For
example, the CRSP index grew at an av-
erage annual rate of 14.9 percent over the
1993–2000 period, compared with only
9.4 percent over the 1950–92 period.
Figure 6 shows growth in the housing
market, based on the dollar value of a
home purchased in 1950. For growth
FIGURE 3
Real income per capita, 1950–2002
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from Haver Analytics.46 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 4
Mortality probabilities, by wealth quartile
probability of death, by wealth, women











Sources: AHEAD data and authors’ calculations.
rates between 1950 and 1971, data are from the price
index for private residential investment divided by the
price index for all personal consumption expenditures,
as measured in the National Income and Product ac-
counts. For housing price growth after 1971, data are
the price series from the Conventional Mortgage Home
Price Index from the Office of Federal Housing Enter-
prise Oversight, which is a price index of single family
homes.10
Figure 6 shows that housing prices grew much
more rapidly over the 1993–2000 sample period than
over the previous 40 years; prices grew 2.3 percent
over the 1993–2000 period, versus .8 per-
cent over the 1971–92 period.
Table 1 shows that in our AHEAD
sample, 28 percent of household wealth
is held in stocks, either directly or through
IRAs (Cheng and French, 2000, find that
60 percent of all IRA wealth was held in
stocks during our sample period and we
assume that 50 percent of all wealth in
trusts are in stock market wealth). Another
36 percent of wealth is held in housing.
Much of the remainder of household wealth
is held in assets that likely did not grow
very much over the sample period, such
as short-term bonds.
Life-cycle asset profiles
Panel A of figure 7 (p. 48) presents
estimates of the life-cycle asset profile
for five different five-year birth cohorts
using both fixed-effects and ordinary
least squares (OLS) (we detail our estima-
tion methods in box 1 on p. 49). Consid-
er the OLS estimates first. These life-cycle
profiles are for the cohorts aged from
70–74 through 90–94 in 1993. Because
the OLS estimator of assets at each age is
merely the sample mean, it is unsurpris-
ing that the 1993 value of mean assets for
each cohort reported in the panel A of
figure 7 is roughly the same as the mean
assets from the 1993 cross-section of as-
sets reported in figure 2. Note that in 1993,
mean household wealth was $283,000
for those aged 70–74, $230,000 for those
75–79, $191,000 for those 80–84,
$163,000 for those 85–89, and $100,000
for those 90–94. In other words, wealth
of the oldest cohort was 64 percent lower
than wealth of the youngest cohort in
1993. One could argue that this is evi-
dence of asset run-down within households (Hurd,
1990). Recall, however, that households aged 90–94 in
1993 were born 20 years earlier than households aged
70–74 in 1993. If aggregate income grows 1.7 percent
per year, then the lifetime income of the oldest cohort
is 34 percent lower than for the youngest cohort. There-
fore, the fact that the 1993 wealth level is 65 percent
lower for the 90–94 cohort relative to the 70–75 co-
hort is evidence of only a minor run-down in assets.
When tracking assets of households within a co-
hort, note the rapid increases in assets over the length
of the panel. For example, assets increase about 37
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FIGURE 5
Stock prices, 1950–2002
CRSP index, adjusting for inflation










housing price level, by year (1950=100)






Source: Center for Research in Security Prices.
Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise data from Haver Analytics.
percent between 1993 and 2000 for the cohort aged
70–74 in 1993. Although one could argue that this is
evidence that wealthy households intentionally in-
crease their wealth, recall that asset prices increased
rapidly over the sample period. Recall that stock
price growth was 7 percent above its average over
the 1950–1992 period and housing price growth was
1.5 percent above its average for the 1971–1992 peri-
od. If individuals expected average asset price
growth over the seven years of the 1993–2000 peri-
od, their stock market wealth would be (1.055)7 –1 =
45% higher than anticipated and their
housing wealth would be (1.015)7 – 1 =
11% higher than anticipated.11 Given that
28 percent of household wealth is held in
stocks and 36 percent in housing, house-
hold wealth was approximately (.28 ×
.45 + .36 × .11) = 17% higher than antic-
ipated. Therefore, much (but not all) of
the apparent run-up in assets results from
the run-up in asset prices.
Next, consider the fixed-effects pro-
files. Fixed-effects profiles show less as-
set growth with age. If no members of
the sample left the survey for death or
other reasons, OLS and fixed-effects
would produce the same results as fixed
effects. However, because sample mem-
bers die, the two profiles are different,
especially for the older cohorts with
higher mortality rates. Because the fixed-
effects estimator estimates asset growth
for the same households, it does not suf-
fer from mortality bias.12
Although fixed-effects estimates in-
dicate slower asset growth than OLS, they
still show increases in assets with age, in-
dicating that the same sample members
had significant run-ups in assets during
the sample period. The question remains,
however, whether these run-ups in assets
were anticipated. Because the sample pe-
riod was 1993–2000 and the fixed-effects
profiles track asset growth over the sam-
ple period, the fixed-effects profiles still
suffer from mixing anticipated asset
gains with unanticipated asset gains from
the stock market, as mentioned earlier.
Additionally, the wealth profiles pre-
sented above mix the asset growth of dif-
ferent types of households. Panel B of
figure 7 shows that for households with
both a husband and a wife present in wave
1 (that is, in 1993), asset growth was even more rapid
than for the full sample. Panels C and D of figure 7
show that for single women and men in wave 1, re-
spectively, there is very little evidence of asset run-up
over the sample period. Hurd (1990) also finds more
evidence of asset run-down by singles than couples.
There are three possible reasons the asset profiles
of these three groups differ. First, asset compositions
may be different across household types. However,
the differences turn out to be fairly small. For example,
both couples and single women have 23 percent of48 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 7
Average assets, by age and cohort
A. Wealth profile, OLS and fixed-effects estimate, everyone
C. Wealth profile, OLS and fixed-effects estimate, women
B. Wealth profile, OLS and fixed-effects estimate, couples
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Sources: AHEAD data and authors’ calculations.
their assets in stocks, and single men have 18 percent
of their assets in stocks. Therefore, couples benefited
only slightly more from the run-up in the stock mar-
ket than did singles. A second possible explanation is
that singles are less likely to have children than couples
(although there are many singles who were previously
married in our sample) and are less likely to have a
strong bequest motive. Third, it may be that couples
have stronger life-cycle savings motives than singles.
Married individuals tend to live longer than singles.
We leave a deeper understanding of these differences
for future research.49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 1
Statistical methods
In the section, “Life-cycle asset profiles,” we provide
estimates of expected wealth at each age given that
the individual was observed in the initial period. We
do this using both OLS and fixed-effects estimators.
This box discusses the difference between the two
estimators. Specifically, we show that using fixed-
effects estimators overcomes the mortality bias
problem, where the OLS estimator does not.
Consider a set of individuals referenced by
i ∈ {1, ..., I} who were born in 1923 (in practice,
we use five-year cohorts, one being born 1919–23).
As we described earlier, we observe these individuals
in 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000. Therefore, we ob-
serve members of this cohort at age 70, 72, 75, and
77. We denote their age by a ∈{70, 72, ..., A}, where
A = 77. Assets of a particular individual at a certain
age, denoted Aia, are determined by the following
function:
1) Aia = fi + β(a) + uia,
where fi is the individual’s fixed effect, which in-
cludes all age-invariant factors, uia is a residual, and
β(a) is a function of a. We wish to estimate the
function β(a) which measures how assets change as
individuals age. The results from the section on as-
set run-down in the life-cycle model indicate that
understanding β(a) will help us better understand
savings motives after retirement. We estimate the
function using a full set of dummy variables, that is,
{}
72




aa a g e
=
β= β× = ∑
where  72 {}
A
age age= β  represents1 a vector of parame-
ters to estimate and the 0-1 indicator function 1{.}
returns 1 when the statement in parentheses is true
and returns 0 otherwise.
The fixed effect fi and the residual uia merit fur-
ther discussion. The fixed effect captures objects
such as lifetime earnings. Individuals with high life-
time earnings likely have high wealth at every age.
The residual captures variation in wealth aris-
ing from short-term contingencies, such as medical
expenses. It also captures the difference between
the true level of assets and reported assets, that is, it
is possibly measurement error.
We are interested in obtaining consistent esti-
mates of the parameter vector {βage}. However,
OLS estimates of the regression
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will not yield consistent estimates {βage}.
To see the problem with OLS and how fixed
effects circumvents this problem, consider figure B1.
It shows wealth profiles of two households. The first
household has $250,000 in every year. The second
household has $50,000 in every year until death, at
age T. In the notation above,  f1 = $250,000,  f2 = $50,000,
βage = 0 for all ages, and u1a = u2a = 0 for all ages.
FIGURE B1
OLS estimators













The OLS estimator estimates average assets at
each age. When both households are alive, average
assets are $150,000. When only the wealthy house-
hold is alive (after age T), average assets are $250,000.
Therefore, the OLS estimator infers that average as-
sets jump at age T. While assets did rise at this age,
they did not rise for any individual.
The fixed-effects estimator, on the other hand,
infers whether assets rise relative to the fixed effect
(fi). The fixed effects estimator correctly infers that
assets do not rise at any age for individual i and thus
βage = 0 at all ages. We give a more technical discus-
sion in appendix B.
1Because we have a fixed-effect for each household, the age
70 coefficient is captured in the intercept term fi because the
age 70 wealth level is just the average fixed effect for individu-
als age 70.50 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Conclusion
A key implication of the simplest version of the
life-cycle model is that assets are run down as indi-
viduals near death. This article presents new evidence
on the lack of asset run-down at the end of the life
cycle. We show that assets decline with age when ob-
serving different individuals at different ages at a sin-
gle point in time. However, the younger individuals
in the sample, who were born more recently, are likely
to have higher income and wealth at every age. When
looking at a single point in time, this leads to an over-
statement of wealth when young and thus overstates
the extent to which assets decline with age. We also
show that wealth rises with age when tracking the same
individuals as they age. Because we track households
over the 1993–2000 period, we observe individuals
in 1993 and the same individuals seven years later, in
2000. Although we can measure the asset growth of
the exact same people, we do not know whether assets
grew because of intentional savings decisions or be-
cause of the run-up in the stock market over this period.
We are partly able to resolve these discrepancies. When
we make some simple adjustments, we find little evi-
dence that people intend to either increase or decrease
their assets near the end of their lives. We take this as
evidence against the simplest versions of the life-cy-
cle model. We also show that our results fit better with
versions of the life-cycle model that are augmented
to include life expectancy and medical expense uncer-
tainty as well as bequest motives.51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIX A: A MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE LIFE-CYCLE MODEL
In order to fix ideas about the life-cycle model, we discuss a parameterized mathematical model of how individuals
consume and save over their lives. In figure 1 (p. 42), we show the implied consumption and wealth profiles for a
given initial value of wealth and for income over the life cycle. As in the introduction, assume that there is no uncer-
tainty about income, or medical expenses, although we will allow for uncertainty about age of death. The model is
similar to that of Palumbo (1999), although it also allows for a bequest function, as in Hurd (1990).
Specifically, consider a household head seeking to maximize his expected lifetime utility at age t  = 70, 71, 72,
... . Each period that he lives, the individual receives utility, Ut, from consumption, Ct. Furthermore, assume that his










−γ  The parameter γ is called the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. The greater the value of γ, the more risk averse the individual. Most estimates
of γ are between 1 and 5. A value of γ equal to 1 implies that an individual would be indifferent between consuming
$14,140 this year or consumption determined by the following lottery: with probability 1/2 consume $10,000 this
year and with probability 1/2 consume $20,000. Note that this lottery has an expected payout of 1/2 × $10,000 +
1/2 × $20,000 = $15,000. If the individual has a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 5, an individual would be
indifferent between consuming $11,700 this year or consumption determined by the lottery described above. In
other words, the greater the value of γ, the greater the amount the individual is willing to pay to avoid the risk
associated with a lottery.











−γ  The greater the value of θB, the stronger the bequest motive. We know very little about
this parameter.
Let st denote the probability of being alive at age t conditional on being alive at age t – 1, and let
(,) ( 1 / )
j
kt tk Sj t s s = = ∏ denote the probability of living to age j ≥ t, conditional on being alive at age t. Let T = 95 denote
the terminal period, so that sT+1 = 0.
We assume that preferences take the form
1
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where Et is an expectations operator and β is the time discount factor. The smaller the value of β, the more individu-
als discount the future relative to the present. Most estimates of β are between .95 and 1.
Furthermore, assume that individuals have the following asset accumulation equation:
5) At+1 = (1 + r)(At + Yt – mt – Ct), At+1 ≥ 0,
where r is the interest rate, Yt is income, and mt denotes medical expenses. Assets must always be non-negative in all
periods.1 In this article we present simulations from this model.
When presenting profiles implied by the model, we consider a value of γ equal to 3 and β equal to .95.
Throughout the article, we assume that assets in the bank receive a 4 percent rate of interest. Initial assets at age 70
are $300,000 (which is close to the mean for our sample), income at each age is $20,000 (which is close to the mean
in our sample).
1If the non-negativity constraint on assets implies consumption below $5,000 (which is a conservative estimate of the SSI, housing, and
Medicaid benefits the elderly can receive), we set consumption equal to $5,000. See French and Jones (2004a) for more on this.52 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIX B: WHY OLS WILL NOT YIELD CONSISTENT ESTIMATES, BUT FIXED EFFECTS WILL:
A TECHNICAL DISCUSSION
To understand why OLS is unlikely to produce consistent estimates, consider the “true” model in equations 1
and 2 as well as the OLS estimator in equation 3 (in box 1). Note that eia = fi + uia – f. Recall that those with above
average values of wealth (an above average value of fi) are likely to live longer than average. As a result,
E[(fi – f)1{a = age}] > 0 for a large value of a (that is, at older ages), which will result in {βage} being
biased upwards for a large value of a. We obtain consistent estimates of {βage} only if E[eia × 1{a = age}] = 0.
By de-meaning the data, however, we can overcome this problem. Specifically, we estimate the regression:
6) 1{ } 1{ } , ia i i i age age ia i
age age
A A f f a age a age u u
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where , , and so on. Note that 0.If [ 1{ }] 0, then
1{ } 1{ } 0, and wewill obtain consistent estimates.We discuss the
plausibility of this assumption in the text.
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When predicting assets using the fixed effects estimator, we use the average fixed effect of the cohort
members observed in 1970.53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1In the simplest life-cycle model, the assumptions are that indi-
viduals know their future income, medical expenses, and health
status, and that individuals have constant relative risk aversion
preferences.
2If individuals are certain of all future events, then whether con-
sumption is increasing or decreasing over the life cycle depends
on only two things: the discount rate and the rate of interest.
First, if individuals are very impatient (have a high discount rate),
then they will consume more in the present, less in the future.
Second, if the market rate of interest is high, then individuals will
have an incentive to save money, consuming less in the present,
more in the future.
3There are several other facts that the simplest version of the life
cycle cannot explain. For example, the distribution of wealth is
much more skewed than the distribution of income (Díaz-
Giménez et al., 1997). Also, the saving rate of people with higher
lifetime income is much higher than the one of people with lower
levels of lifetime income (Dynan et al., 1996).
4Under this law, the estate tax will be re-imposed in 2011.
5Assuming no bequest motive and uncertain mortality, and hold-
ing income taxes constant, repealing estate taxes might reduce
savings levels and thus output. The intuition behind this is that
children of the deceased might reduce savings rates given that
they can finance retirement with assets that their parents leave
behind to hedge against extended life. This would, in turn, reduce
aggregate savings and thus capital.
6Survivor probabilities are taken from U.S. life tables.
7Hurd (1989) argues that uncertain life expectancy can explain
the slow rate of asset run-down in his data from the Retirement
History Survey.
8However, we found that medical expense risk could generate a
large amount of savings for some parameter of the model. For ex-
ample in results not reported, we found that the importance of
medical expenses depends critically upon the extent to which the
government provides insurance against catastrophic medical ex-
penses through what we refer to as “consumption floors.” Con-
sumption floors are meant to capture social insurance schemes such
as Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and food stamps.
Results presented are for the case when we set the consumption
floor to $5,000. Given that Medicaid covers virtually all medical
expenses, and SSI provides income to individuals who have low
income and assets, we believe that this is a conservative value for
the consumption floor. For example, SSI benefits are $9,480 per
year in California and $7,200 in Nevada. Nevertheless, lowering
the consumption floor to $100 produces much higher savings
rates. Also, higher levels of risk aversion produce higher levels of
savings.
9In the life tables for the U.S., the corresponding probability of
death at age 80 is 8.6 percent. This discrepancy is possibly due to
the fact that the core sample in the AHEAD was not in a nursing
home in 1993. Therefore, the AHEAD sample is healthier than
the U.S. population.
10The main difference between the two measures is in the controls
for the quality of the home. The quality of homes has changed
over time as different amenities become available for homes.
Some features on homes, such as intercom service, were not
available 50 years ago. Therefore, comparing average home price
from year to year provides a misleading picture of housing price
appreciation. The price index for private residential investment
measures the price of new homes. Adjustments for changes in the
quality of new homes is made using a hedonic adjustment. The
other index is constructed using resale prices of the exact same
homes whose mortgages are held or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac. Although this approach overcomes the problems as-
sociated with hedonics, the approach still has problems. Most im-
portantly, the approach does not account for home improvements.
Moreover, these indices are available only back to 1971.
11This is assuming that the run-up in assets did not affect savings
behavior.
12Shortly before death, assets may decline because of high medi-
cal expenses. Because of this, we may miss significant asset de-
clines if they take place between the time that the individual is
last interviewed and the date of death. This potentially leads us to
understate asset declines before death. French and Jones (2004)
and Hurd and Smith (2001) find that this problem is relatively
minor. Using AHEAD data, Hurd and Smith find that medical ex-
penses just before death are $4,200 and death expenses (such as
burial expenses) are $4,300. Nevertheless, they find that the size
of the estate is on average $36,000 less than the self-reported
level of assets in the interview before death.54 3Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
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